All commercial boiling water reactor (BWR) plants in the U.S. employ primary containments of the pressure suppression design. These primary containments are surrounded and enclosed by a secondary containment consisting of a reactor building and refueling bay (MK I and MK II designs), a shield building, auxiliary building and fuel building (MK III), or an auxiliary building and enclosure building (Grand Gulf style MK III). Although secondary containment designs are highly plant specific, their purpose is to minimize the ground level release of radioactive material for a spectrum of traditional design basis accidents. While not designed for severe accident mitigation, these secondary containments might also reduce the radiological consequences of severe accidents. This issue is receiving increasing attention due to concerns that BWR MK I primary containment integrity would be lost should a significant mass of molten debris escape the reactor vessel during a severe accident. Failure of the primary containment pressure boundary during a severe accident may result in the discharge of large quantities of hydrogen into the secondary containment atmosphere. Deflagration of this hydrogen within the secondary containment would result in pressure loadings which might threaten secondary containment structural integrity. The fission product retention capability of an intact secondary containment will depend on several factors. Recent analyses indicate that the major factors influencing secondary containment effectiveness include: the mode and location of the primary containment failure, the internal architectural design of the secondary containment, the design of the standby gas treatment system, and the ability of fire protection system sprays to remove suspended aerosols from the secondary containment atmosphere. Each of these factors interact in a very complex manner to determine secondary containment severe accident mitigation performance. This paper presents a brief overview of domestic BWR secondary containment designs and highlights plant-specific features that could influence secondary containment severe accident survivability and accident mitigation effectiveness. Current issues surrounding secondary containment performance are discussed, and insights gained from recent ORNL secondary containment studies of Browns Ferry, Peach Bottom, and Shoreham are presented. Areas of significant uncertainty are identified and recommendations for future research are presented.
INTRODUCTION
All commercial boiling water reactor (BWR) plants in the U.S. employ primary containments of the pressure suppression design. These primary containments are surrounded and enclosed by a secondary containment consisting of a reactor building and refueling bay (MK I and MK II designs), a shield building, auxiliary building and fuel building (MK III), or an auxiliary building and enclosure building (Grand Gulf style MK III). Although secondary containment designs are highly plant specific, their purpose is to minimize the ground level release of radioactive material for a spectrum of traditional design basis accidents. while not designed for severe accident mitigation, these secondary containments might also reduce the radiological consequences of severe accidents. This issue is receiving increasing attention due to concerns that BWR MK I primary containment integrity would be lost should a significant fraction of the reactor core become molten and escape the reactor vessel during a severe accident. During the past eight years ORNL has been heavily involved in EWR severe accident analysis efforts, as the lead analysis center for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's EWR Severe Accident Sequence Analysis (SASA) and BWR Severe Accident Technology (BWRSAT) programs.l'24 The goal of these programs has been to provide the NRC with a best-estimate, deterministic analysis capability for BWR severe accidents (ie accidents which progress through core-uncovery, core melting, and reactor vessel failure). Through this period, ORNL has benefited from the cooperation of the utilities that own and operate the plants that have been studied: the Tennessee Valley Authority for Browns Ferry studies, and the Philadelphia Electric Company for Peach Bottom studies. Additionally, ORNL has had access to and extensively applied state-of-che-arr severe accident simulation codes such as CONTAIN and MBLCOR.2$·Z6 2. BWR SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONCEPT Exhibit 1 is a simplified representation of the multi-barrier containment concept and the manner in which it is implemented in the domestic BwRs. The fission product inventory of the plant is contained within the Zircaloy-clad fuel pins which, with the channel boxes, collectively constitute the reactor core. The second barrier to fission product release during an accident is the reactor vessel (BWR reactor vessels would be isolated behind closed main steam isolation valves during severe accident sequences). The third barrier to fission product release is provided by the primary containment, which (in a MK I plant) consists of the inverted light bulb-shaped drywell and the toroidal-shaped wetwell (which is housed in the basement of the reactor building). The final barrier to fission product release is the secondary containment (reactor building and refueling bay), which completely surrounds and encloses the primary containment. BWR secondary containment reactor buildings are massive, multi-floored structures with reinforced external concrete walls. Secondary containment above the top of the reactor building is provided by a refueling bay constructed of corrugated sheet metal walls that contain large blowout panels to provide protection from the effects of tornados and internal reactor building provided pressurization due to steam line in the steam tunnel which connects breaks. Blowout panels are also the reactor and turbine buildings.
3. SEVERE ACCIDENT PHENOMENOLOGY One scenario for a BWR severe accident begins with the failure of all normal and emergency core cooling systems. (It should be noted that this is an extremely unlikely event because BWRs employ as many as thirteen different systems capable of injecting water into the reactor vessel.) This loss of injection capability is followed by a gradual boiloff of the reactor coolant inventory, and uncovery of the reactor's core. As the water level drops within the core, fuel temperatures increase significantly, leading to oxidation of the Zircaloy fuel cladding -a highly exothermic reaction which generates substantial quantities of hydrogen and dramatically increases the fuel heatup rate. This hydrogen is either vented to the pressure suppression pool via the safety/relief valves, or escapes to the primary containment upon reactor vessel failure. The continued heating of the core materials eventually leads to the release of fission products from the fuel, and the subsequent melting and downward relocation of core material into the bottom (lower head) of the reactor vessel. The hot core debris (continually heated by nuclear decay heat and the exothermic Zircaloy oxidation reaction) thermally attacks the lower head, leading to reactor vessel failure and expulsion of hot core debris onto the concrete floor of the primary containment. The reaction of the hot core debris with the primary containment concrete would proceed in a very complex manner, releasing fission product vapors, fission product-laden aerosols, additional hydrogen, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, and water vapor. The exact mix of gases generated by the core/concrete reaction is a function of the type of concrete employed, and the amount of un-oxidized Zircaloy leaving the reactor vessel. It should be noted that in an unmitigated BWR severe accident the entire Zircaloy inventory of the reactor would eventually oxidize (either in the reactor vessel or on the drywell floor), generating as much as 6000 lb (2722 kg) of hydrogen (plant specific value). These reaction products heat and pressurize the primary containment, and the debris might directly attack the steel primary containment shell (MK I design) or drywell downcomers (MK II). The primary containment boundary would ultimately fail, releasing fission products, aerosols, steam, and combustible gases into the surrounding secondary containment. The aerosols and fission products would migrate through the reactor building and some of the fission products would eventually escape to the surrounding environment via the refueling bay blowout panels (which would open to relieve the internal reactor building pressurization generated by the primary containment blowdown and the deflagrations).
INSIGHT: BWR SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DESIGNS ARE HIGHLY PLANT
SPECIFIC The secondary containments of domestic BWRs were designed and/or constructed by ten different architect/engineering firms (Table 1) , and vary considerably in basic design characteristics such as volume, number of floors, the arrangement of stairways and elevator shafts, etc. Shorehann employs an RBSVS (rather than an SGTS) which recirculates the bulk of the reactor building atmosphere through filter trains, while exhausting only minor fractions of the RBSVS flow. Consequently, Shoreham's system requires 19.7 hours to exhaust one reactor building atmosphere. Finally, as can be seen from Table 2 , Browns Ferry utilizes an extensive pre-action fire protection spray system, while Peach Bottom and Shoreham employ very limited pre-action spray systems. The significance of SGTS and fire protection spray system design differences will be discussed in the following sections. failure location is that it affords the maximum opportunity for scrubbing of fission products and aerosols, since the blowdown must flow through major portions of the reactor building prior to escaping to the environment. Great concern has recently been voiced about the possibility of MK I drywell shell failure due to direct attack by core debris.]? Recent work by ORNL has revealed that the probability of this failure mode is a strong function of the type of concrete employed for the drywell floor, with limestonecommon sand concrete affording more protection than high-limestone concrete.23 The limestone-common sand concrete ablates at lower temperatures than high-limestone concrete, leading to greater dissolution of the core debris by concrete oxides and lower debris temperatures than would result in the case of high-limestone concrete. This depression of debris temperatures is gained, however, at the expense of higher containment pressures and temperatures produced by the accelerated degassing of the limestone-common sand concrete. In the event that shell failure does occur near the level of the drywell floor, the drywell blowdown would be expected to enter the lower regions of the reactor building via the annular gaps surrounding the vent pipes leading to the torus room.2W3JA third potential mechanism for BWR primary containment failure is primary containment shell or penetration failure due to collapse of the reactor vessel caused by ablation of the reactor's concrete support pedestal. Recent ORNL studies have revealed that more than 75% of the reactor pedestal wall thickness may be eroded due to concrete ablation in some cases.?] The probability of this failure mode is a strong function of the amount of zirconium metal available for oxidation on the drywell floor. It should be noted that the weight of the reactor vessel and internals would be decreased prior to pedestal failure due to expulsion of the core and core support materials following reactor vessel failure The resulting load on the reactor pedestal would, therefore, be significantly reduced. Unfortunately, the most probable location for primary containment failure following pedestal collapse has not been determined (and is Browns Ferry plant utilizes a system that employs fused-link sprinklers which cover the first three floors of the reactor building (soon to be upgraded to cover all floors). The system consists of two 10000 gallon (37.8 m3) raw service water (RSW) storage tanks (located atop the reactor building), four RSW pumps which maintain the tank inventory during normal operation, four fire system pumps (one of which is diesel-driven), and the sprinkler system. The RSW storage tanks provide a 20000 gallon (75.7 n@), gravity-fed sprinkler supply reservoir, and no power is required for actuation of the fused-link sprinklers. ORNL first identified the secondary containment fire protection system as a potential severe accident mitigation system during a previous SASA study. 27 Although not designed for severe accident mitigation, the fused-link sprinklers would actuate following primary containment failure due to increased reactor building atmospheric temperatures. While major portions ofthe first three floors of the Browns Ferry reactor building are covered by the current spray system, during station blackout conditions the spray system would be fed only by the roof-top RSW storage tanks, and the single diesel-driven fire pump. Under these circumstances, water is available to the third floor sprinklers only until the RSW tanks are depleted. The first and second floor sprinklers are continuously fed, however, by the single diesel-driven pump. Exhibit 3 displays the results of two Browns Ferry short-term station blackout calculations in which (a) operation of the spray system was inhibited, and (b) the spray system was assumed to function in its normal manner. The ordinate of Exhibit 3 is the fraction of the total aerosol inventory (that has escaped the primary containment) retained in the reactor building, the turbine building, and the environment at one hour after primary containment failure. The impact of spray system operation can clearly be seen by noting the difference in the environmental aerosol inventory. Fractional aerosol releases are decreased from 33% to 10% by (limited) spray operation. It is apparent, therefore, that secondary containment fire protection systems can significantly enhance the secondary containment aerosol decontamination factor. Unfortunately, many plants do not employ pre-action sprinklers, while other plants utilize systems with extremely limited coverage. 8. INSIGHTS: ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SGTS/RBSVS ARE HIGHLY VARIABLE All BWR secondary containments incorporate a system designed to filter (through charcoal and high efficiency particulate absolute [HEPA] filters) and exhaust primary containment purge gas during normal startup and shutdown operations. These systems are also employed to process the secondary containment atmosphere during accident conditions. Most MK I plants utilize high capacity standby gas treatment systems (SGTS), which are of the once-through design. These systems draw suction on the reactor building and refueling bay (typically 20000 cfm [9.4 m3/s] total), filter the entire gas stream, and exhaust it through an elevated stack to the atmosphere. Secondary containment makeup air is provided via infiltration and controlled inleakage from the environment. Some MK II plants (Limerick) utilize a low capacity SGTS in conjunction with a reactor enclosure recirculation system (RERS).
The RERS mixes, filters, and recirculates 60000 cfm (28.3 u@/s) between the reactor building and refueling bay. The independent SGTS filters and exhausts much smaller flows (3000 cfm or 1.4 m3/s) to the environment. The Shoreham plant utilizes a reactor building standby ventilation system (RBSVS) which draws suction on the reactor building (45000 cfm or 21.2 m3/s) and discharges (without filtration) to the refueling bay.
Less than 1200 cfm (0.6 n@/s) of this flow is filtered and exhausted to the environment.
The major impact of SGTS operation on the secondary containment atmosphere is filtration and dilution. The major effect of the RERS is filtration and mixing, and the major impact of the RBSVS is mixing.The effectiveness of plant Standby Gas Treatment Systems and Reactor Building Standby Ventilation Systems during severe accidents will be plant and accident sequence-dependent. The SGTS and RBSVS fans would not be operable in station blackout sequences (in which offsite a.c. power and on-site diesels would not be available), so that the potential benefit of these systems is minimal. For other accident sequences in which the system fans are operable, the effectiveness of the systems will be a function of overall system design and capacity, and the primary containment failure location and blowdown rate. During severe accidents, the exhaust capacity of the SGTS, RERS, or RBSVS (if operating) could have a major impact on secondary containment fission product retention, since primary containment blowdown rates in excess of the system exhaust capacity can result in secondary containment pressurization and direct leakage from the secondary containment to the environment.
The operational characteristics of these systems can significantly influence the probability of secondary containment combustible gas deflagrations, and the nature of the threat that such deflagrations pose to secondary containment integrity. (This issue will be discussed in the following section). RBSVS operation might actually decrease secondary containment fission product retention capability for cases in which the primary containment blows down into the lower region of the reactor building, because the system would actively transport fission products from the lower regions of the building to the refueling bay (which would be the secondary containment failure location in many accidents). 9. INSIGHT: COMBUSTIBLB GAS DBFLAGRATIONS MAY THREATEN SURVIVABILITY OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENTS While the aerosol and fission product retention capability of an intact secondary containment may be quite substantial, the overall credibility of the secondary cpntainment function can be compromised if deflagration-induced pressure pulses fail portions of the secondary containment boundary (exterior reactor building walls). Exhibit 4 depicts the results of a series of Browns Ferry short-term station blackout simulations in which the primary containment shell was assumed to fail due to direct contact with the hot core/concrete debris at a time when the primary containment pressure was 85 psia (586 kPa). These two accident mitigation approaches are discussed in this section.
C¤D£ainm£¤L.£DIi¥$i Any discussion of the use of containment sprays for severe accident mitigation must be preceded by a reminder that (in current BWR designs) the containment spray and reactor vessel injection system water supplies and piping are (or can be) interconnected such that containment spray availability is concomitant with reactor vessel injection capability. The argument can therefore be made that all available water should be (and would have been) injected into the reactor to halt the accident prior to vessel melt-through. The discussion of the potential benefits cf containment sprays is, therefore, realistic only in conjunction with the assumption of late recovery of sprays, or the installation of dedicated containment spray systems.
Operation of drywell sprays during a BWR severe accident might result in several phenomena: (a) aerosol scrubbing [via direct spray removal and pool scrubbing if a water pool is maintained above the core debris], (b) steamcondensation, (c) debris freezing, and (d) accelerated metal/water reactions. Perhaps most importantly, it is possible that spray operation will reduce the drywell pressure and upper drywell atmosphere temperature sufficiently to avoid failure of the drywell head flange seals.
(Drywell head flange seal failure would allow the primary containment to vent into the refueling bay, bypassing the majority of the secondary containment.) Interaction of the spray water with the core debris could possibly result in preservation of the steel drywell shell (MK I) or drywell downcomers (MK II). Unfortunately, current inadequacies in experimental data and computational models inhibit resolution of this issue. It should also be noted that the impact of primary containment failure-induced flashing and boiling of water pools which overlie core debris (and the associated potential for resuspension of previously deposited aerosols) cannot be adequately evaluated at the present time.
Existing BWRs employ primary containment venting systems to provide the venting capability necessary for containment inertinq prior to reactor startup and de-inerting prior to personnel entry into the-primary containment. Most existing plant emergency operating procedures call for containment venting when containment pressure reaches or exceeds the design value (48 to 6J psig or 331 to 414 kPa gauge). 35*37 Failure of the vent system ducting is likely under these circumstances, since the systems were not designed for such pressure differentials.
Such ducting failures would allow the vented material to discharge directly into the reactor building, flooding the building with steam and combustible gases, and effectively eliminating furthe: access to the secondary containment. Backfittinq of dedicated "hard" vent systems (which employ high-pressure ducting throughout the entire system but no filters) has been suggested as one mechanism for improving vent reliability. It should also be noted that, existing containment venting systems would not be functional during station blackout sequences. Power (d.c. or a.c. or direct human manipulation) is required for vent valve operation. Containment venting from the wetwell air space in a MK I containment is desirable primarily as a mechanism for reducing combustible gas concentrations in the secondary containment subsequent to drywell shell failure (meltthrough), thereby. increasing the probability of secondary containment survivability.
Containment venting is feasible in a MK I (via either the existing vent system or a dedicated "hard" vent system) because the probability of pressure suppression pool bypass (in the vent system) is very low. It is important to note, therefore, that wetwell venting via either the existing system or a hardened vent system in the MK I design (a) is a mechanism for preservation of secondary containment integrity, and (b) is unlikely to discharge a significant quantity of aerosols into the environment. Containment venting in MK II plants is (in contrast to MK I plants) desirable primarily as a mechanism for preserving primary containment integrity by preventing excessive primary containment pressures (since drywell shell failure via direct attack by core debris appears unlikely). MK II containment venting (via existing systems or simple "hard" systems) appears to be infeasible however, since drywell downcomer failure (and associated pressure suppression pool bypass) due to direct attack from core debris appearsprobable in some designs. It is much more probable that operation of simple "hard" venting systems in MK II plants would result in the discharge of aerosols directly into the environment. It should be noted, therefore, that wetwell venting via either the existing system or a hardened vent system in a MK II design (a) is a mechanism for control of primary containment pressure but (b) is likely to discharge aerosols into the Much is yer to be learned regarding the various modes of primary containment failure, the conditions under which each failure mode would occur, and location of the various failure points. As previously mentioned, analyses com leted to date indicate that the primary containment failure mode and location is a plant-specific and accident sequence dependent characteristic.
The current emphasis of such studies is evaluation of the probability of MK I shell failure due to direct attack by core debris. There are forty BWR units under construction or in operation in the U. S. The vast majority of secondary containment work that has been done to date has focused on station blackout transients at Browns Ferry and Peach Bottom. Recently, some additional work has been done to evaluate the secondary containment performance of the La Salle and Shoreham plants. Detailed secondary containment decontamination factor studies have only been completed for the Peach Bottom design. Since containment designs are highly plant-specific, the results of these studies should not be extrapolated to otherfacilities. Should a consensus evolve within the regulatory community that secondary containment severe accident performance is important, a great deal of effort would be required to develop an understanding of plantspecific design features and the plant-specific severe accident performance of these containments for a range of accident sequences. During the next two years the ORNL BWRSAT Program will be conducting a survey of domestic BWR secondary containments. The goal of this effort is to (a) develop a database for BWR secondary containment design information, (b) identify potentially important plant-specific design features, and (c) perform severe accident response studies for a limited number of secondary containment designs. Additionally, the BWRSAT Program will be expanding the focus of its overall sequence analysis effort to include BWR M II and MK III plants.
Work performed to date indicates that existing EWR secondary containments could play an important role in the mitigation of severe accidents. The reliability and effectiveness of the secondary containment function might be significantly increased via improvements to (a) prevent secondary containment bypass, (b) insure secondary containment integrity, and (c) maximize the fission product retention capability of an intact secondary containment building. Secondary containment bypass can be precluded by ensuring that the primary containment blowdown is directed into the lowest regions of the reactor building, and that drywell head flange seal failure does nct occur. The potential benefit of dedicated drywell spray systems for reduction of drywell head temperatures is currently under investigation at ORNL. Another potential technique for reducing the probability of secondary containment bypass in MK I and MK II plants is to incorporate a rupture diaphragm in the pressure suppression pool air space, to ensure that the primary containment blowdown would be directed to the basement of the reactor building. Such a failure location would enhance the reliability of the pool scrubbing function, and maximize the fraction of the reactor building volume and surfaces available for the various fission product removal processes should a severe accident occur. Such an approach demands intensive scrutiny, however, since it is unlikely that use of the rupture diaphragm system would preclude primary containment failure due to pedestal failure or direct attack of the MK I drywell shell by core/concrete debris. The major threat to secondary containment integrity is hydrogen and carbon monoxide deflagrations.
Primary containment venting to the outside atmosphere can reduce the severity of the secondary containment challenge from such deflagrations by directing combustible gases around the reactor building. This benefit would be gained, however, at the expense of an earlier noble gas release than might otherwise occur. Much work remains to be done to evaluate various candidate venting systems and strategies. The use of both simple hardened venting systems (which do not employ filters) and filtered venting systems should. be examined carefully to determine if such systems are practical for MK II designs (in which pressure suppression p)ol bypass appears more probable than in MK I designs).TWG systems have the potential to significantly enhance secondary containment fission product retention capability. The addition of gravity-fed pre-action fire protection sprays to plants which do not currently have them would seem to offer dual benefits of reduced vulnerability to fires, and enhanced severe accident performance. Analyses should be conducted for a range of secondary containment designs to investigate the costs and benefits of such systems. As previously mentioned, existing gas treatment systems {SGTS/RERS/RBSVS) have the potential to both enhance and decrease secondary containment severe accident performance. Additional evaluations are necessary to (a} identify the various systems currently installed, and (b) determine which operating modes are desirable under severe accident conditions. BQ12.9£.Lbe.tu:hine.buildin¤; The turbine building is normally isolated from the reactor building by the blowout panels in the steam tunnel. As previously discussed, these blowout panels are generally predicted to open following primary containment failure in a severe accident sequence, allowing the reactor building atmosphere to communicate with the turbine building atmosphere. The potential therefore exists for significant quantities of fission products to be passed from the reactor building to the turbine building. While some preliminary analyses have been conducted, the importance of this fission product transport path has not been fully evaluated.27 It is probable that the degree to which the turbine building participates in the accident will be plant-and accident sequence-dependent. 12. SUMMARY Severe (core melt) accidents are extremely improbable events. Never_the_less, the experiences of Three Mile Island and 
